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Abstract
Over the past decade, Peru has witnessed a steady increase in protest activity, often related to
natural resource extraction. From 2006 to 2016, the number of protest events rose from 73 to over
200 per month. Yet this increase was far more prevalent in some provinces than others. What
explains variation in protest surrounding mining projects in Peru? Although scholarly work on
protest is extensive, studies on Peru remain limited and focus on the grievances of social actors
and the political conditions that allow mobilization. However, after conducting an exploratory
study in the agricultural area of the Tambo Valley, I encountered the possible friction between
mining activities and agriculture. I examine the interaction between agricultural importance and a
mining company’s announcement as a determinant of variation in protest across Peruvian provinces
between 2011 and 2015. I hypothesize that a mining company’s announcement of the creation or
advancement of a mining project in Peru has a greater effect on the likelihood of protest, if the
mining project is in a mostly agricultural province. In a context in which protests are widespread,
this project will add nuance to the current debate between economic growth and extractive practices
in mining countries like Peru.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Protests are common in a country like Peru. In April 2015, protests occurred in my hometown,
Arequipa, in the wake of the Tı´a Marı´a mining project. The Peruvian government declared a state
of emergency following violent protests and four people died amidst confrontations between the
local communities and the police. I witnessed blocking of roads, destruction of private property,
looting, and attacks on both private and public transportation in my city during an entire week. The
slogan of the protests was “Agro Sı´, Mina No” (Agriculture yes, Mining not), displayed in green
flags across towns and districts in opposition to the mining project. These kind of protests in the
wake of mining projects have happened only a few times in Peru, and not across every province
that has a mining project.
Peru has witnessed a steady increase in protest activity over the last decade, often related to
natural resource extraction, including minerals, gas, and oil. From 2006 to 2016, the number of
protest events rose from 73 to over 216 per month (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2016). Yet this increase
was far more prevalent in certain provinces than it was in others. For instance, while protests
occurred surrounding some mining projects, such as Tambogrande in the province of Piura, they
did not occur in others, such as Antamina in the province of Huari. I propose in this research
project a plausible explanation for the variation in protest activity in Peru. Therefore, the puzzle
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I aim to solve is that some mining projects are associated with the onset of protest, while some
others are not.
The graph in Figure 1.1 plots protest frequency in Peru from January 2006 to October 2016.
Data on protest also come from the Annual Report on Social Conflict, from the Peruvian Om-
budsman’s Office. Data include monthly reports for ten consecutive years. September 2009
was the month with the highest number of protests across the national territory, registering 288
protest events (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2016). This period corresponds to the second government
of Alan Garcı´a (2006-2011). Although Garcı´a aimed to control social conflicts surrounding mining
projects with the creation of the Social Conflict Unit (SCU), which is responsible for conflict moni-
toring and mediation within the Ombudsman’s Office, the graph shows that protest activity actually
intensified during his administration. The graph also shows that the frequency of protest decreased
at the end of Garcı´a’s administration in July 2011, as the incoming government of Ollanta Humala
(2011-2016) promised to tackle the country’s biggest social issues.
Alan Garcı´a and his APRA party continued the neoliberal economic models adopted by his
predecessors, Alberto Fujimori (1990-2001) and Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). Garcı´a strongly
believed in a free-market economy that welcomes foreign investment, especially focused on the
extraction of Peru’s natural resources. Li (2015) describes that Garcı´a believed that modern min-
ing represents a departure from the polluting practices of old mining, and that extractive activities
were the solution to make Peru’s land productive. He often disagreed with protesters, and has
even gone so far as to describe their mobilizations as “savage and barbaric,” and portrayed indige-
nous protesters as “second class citizens” (Li, 2015). President Garcı´a disregarded the claims of
protesters by referring to them as “a past ideology, idleness, and laziness” (Arce, 2014). Garcı´a’s
economic policies and a discriminatory attitude against indigenous communities seemingly ac-
counted for an increase in protest events across the national territory.
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Figure 1.1: Protest Frequency in Peru, 2006-2016
Source: Data from the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office, downloaded on October 30, 2016. Cu-
mulative frequency distribution of protest covers a ten-year period (2006-2016) and includes 195
provinces in Peru. Data include observations of all types of protest activity.
The map in Figure 1.2 plots the cumulative frequency distribution of the number of protest
events that occurred across 195 Peruvian provinces over the course of five years, between 2011
and 2015. Data come from the Annual Report on Social Conflict, a monthly report produced by
the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office, which monitors protests and social conflicts in Peru (Defenso-
ria del Pueblo, 2016). Following an analysis of the data, I display in white provinces that have not
had any protest activity occurring during the past five years. I display in two shades of gray the
provinces that had between 1 and 5, and 6-15 protests respectively. Finally, I display in black the
provinces that have had 16 conflicts or more in the last five years. For the empirical analysis in
Chapter 3, protest activity will refer only to protests that occurred in the wake of mining projects.
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Figure 1.2: Map of Peru with Cumulative Frequency of Protest, 2011-2015
Source: Data come from the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office Annual Report on Social Conflict,
2016. Cumulative frequency distribution of protest covers a five-year period (2011-2015) and
includes 195 provinces in Peru. Data include observations of all types of protest activity.
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1.1 The Argument
To explain the spatial and cross-temporal variation in protests, I suspect that the onset of protest
surrounding mining projects are somehow associated with the importance of agricultural activities.
I hypothesize that a mining company’s announcement of the creation or advancement of a mining
project in Peru has a greater effect on the likelihood of protest, if the mining project is in a mostly
agricultural province.
I examine the interaction between agricultural importance and a mining company’s announce-
ment as a determinant of variation in protest across Peruvian provinces between 2011 and 2015.
I use total agricultural land as measure of the importance of agriculture in a particular province,
as it encompasses different areas used for agricultural purposes, including arable land and perma-
nent crops. Moreover, I consider all the announcements made by mining companies regarding the
status of a particular mining project as a measure of mining activities. There are four categories
for the announcement, which correspond to different status in the mining project, including (1)
exploration, (2) evaluation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), (3) approved EIA, and
(4) expansion of an existing project. Announcements of mining projects represent an ongoing di-
alogue between the mining companies, the government, and the local populations as they aim to
inform the population about the status of a mining project.
1.2 Agro Sı´, Mina No
The extraction of natural resources in Peru encounters opposition that could be summarized in two
different sections of the literature.
First, some scholars have demonstrated that mining activities have created pressures on the
quantity and quality of water resources, livelihood assets, and social relationships (Bebbington
et al., 2007; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Arce, 2014). This literature focuses on environmental claims
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made by the local population, arguing that mining activities pollute land, air, and water. Groups of
farmers and peasants often use environmental claims to oppose mining companies, because they
seemingly perceive mining activities as a direct threat to their economic activities. Li (2015) an-
alyzed the environmentalist discourse in opposition to the development of mining projects, based
on concerns about pollution, biodiversity, and water scarcity. Two other factors that the environ-
mentalist discourse includes are the defense of the agricultural land and diminished water flows
in irrigation canals (Li, 2015). Social movements in Peru and communities of farmers have orga-
nized over time seemingly in response to the rapid spread of mining activities across the national
territory. Economic liberalization policies in the 1990s under the regime of Fujimori transformed
Peru into a neoliberal state based on natural resource extraction. This model allowed the expan-
sion of mining activities, possibly perpetuating social and environmental conflicts with local rural
communities.
Another section of the literature focuses on claims based on the Indigenous cosmovision and
the relationship between human and nature in the Andes and the Amazon. This literature considers
that people do not oppose mining activities only because they pollute, but because nature and its
beings, considered “earth-beings,” have rights of their own and thus should be respected (De la
Cadena, 2010). De la Cadena (2010) writes that “the appearance of earth-beings in social protests
may evince a moment of rupture of modern politics and an emergent indigeneity.” This emergent
indigeneity corresponds to the model of collective well-being or Sumac Kawsay (“the good life”
in Quechua). This lifestyle proposes building a society based on the harmony between humans
and nature, which challenges the commodification of nature, and includes paradigms that consider
the intrinsic value of nature itself independent from human valorization (Svampa, 2015; Gudynas,
2011). Sumac Kawsay also recognizes the rights of nature, which involves the respect for its ex-
istence and the maintenance of its vital cycles, structures and evolutionary processes (Isch Lopez,
2008; Walsh, 2010; Gudynas, 2011). Sumac Kawsay proposes new forms of relation between hu-
man beings and nature and among human beings (Acosta, 2010). Some Latin American countries
6
have already adopted this form of integral and sustainable human development in their state policy,
including Ecuador, which modified its Constitution in 2008 in order to include nature as a subject
of rights (Roca Servat, 2012; Svampa, 2015).
Indigenous communities are able to preserve their unique culture and identity, caring for an
environment that will provide for generations to come. Sumac Kawsay is embedded in the ethi-
cal values of indigenous cultures. The lack of representation of indigenous communities and the
peasantry in economic matters might lead to social conflict. The Andean cosmovision is not about
beliefs, it is about the indigenous peoples’ experience of reality, which combine ontological and
epistemological foundations. Indigenous peoples have a different cosmovision regarding lakes,
rivers, and land (De la Cadena, 2010); which has been disregarded by the state and mining compa-
nies, which have constantly tried to replace natural bodies of water with man-made reservoirs. The
Peruvian state has historically ignored the interests of communities who live outside its capital,
thus reinforcing an internal social division (Roca Servat, 2012).
In the empirical study about the relationship between protest, mining, and agriculture in Chap-
ter 3, I do not include a measure that accounts for the relationship between humans beings and
earth-beings based on the indigenous cosmovision. I cannot quantify the impact of Sumac Kawsay,
as only a detailed ethnographic study could capture that relationship of harmony, and that study is
outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I estimate Omitted-variable bias (OVB) in my empirical
study and I encourage further research on the effects that Sumac Kawsay has in sparking protest
activity in Peru. In the following sub-section I introduce examples of cases that have used different
claims opposing natural resource extraction.
1.3 A Tale of Two Mines
This project aims to understand the conditions that are more likely to spark protest activity sur-
rounding mining projects in Peru. Antonio Brack, Peru’s first Minister of the Environment, ac-
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curately stated, “Peru was, is, and will be a mining country. To say otherwise is an illusion” (Li,
2015). Economic activities of extraction have increased over time, with several mining projects be-
ing announced every year. The Conga Project and Lagunas Norte project are two mining projects
that had discrepancies with the local communities at some point in their development, but imple-
mented different approaches to deal with the claims made by local communities. Both projects
are located near rural communities in northern Peru. Project Conga is located in the provinces of
Cajamarca and Celendin in the Cajamarca region, and Lagunas Norte is located in the province of
Santiago de Chuco in La Libertad region. Both projects have similar infrastructure and they are
close to water sources (Triscritti, 2013). However, they only differ in protest activity that arose as
consequence of its development.
The Conga Project, a gold-mining project owned by the American company Newmont Mining
Corporation and the Peruvian company Buenaventura, presented an example of contentious activ-
ities expressing resistance from the local population. Triscritti (2013) reports that in 2004 violent
protests arose in the wake of the development of the mining project, when protesters seemingly
complained about both environmental issues concerning the use of water and indigenous resis-
tance based on the rights of nature. The mining company planned to remove four lakes and replace
them with four man-made water reservoirs. For communities of farmers, the claims were based
on pollution and the use of water. For indigenous communities, the claims were also regarding
water, but not as the object of their economic activities, but “water as the blood of the Earth.”
This quote comes from the documentary Daughter of the Lake (2015), which narrates the story
of Ne´lida Ayay Chilo´n, a Peruvian indigenous, who following Andean cosmovision, worships the
life-bearing Mother Water present in all lakes and rivers. Ne´lida considers herself the daughter of
these lakes that have provided life to the members of her village over generations. Confrontations
between local communities and the police continued, and many people were injured and five others
died. The government declared a state of emergency and the Conga Project had to be postponed
for another two years. Instead of strengthening community relations, the Conga Project’s officials
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believed that they had the unconditional right to operate, and managed all communications through
officials in Lima rather than developing good relationships with the authorities and the community
at the local level (Triscritti, 2013).
The Lagunas Norte gold mine promoted a different mining model of dialogue with the com-
munities. Local communities of farmers often presented environmental claims related to the use
of water. This mine is owned by the Canadian corporation Barrick Gold, the largest gold mining
company in the world, which made efforts to incorporate the demands and grievances of the people
in the local community, through the Community Grievance Management Resolution Procedures.
For instance, Barrick implemented demands regarding access to labor opportunities, increase of
salaries, and concerns regarding the use of water through dialogue groups between mining rep-
resentatives and the local communities 1 Barrick Gold developed a community-relation team and
implemented water management systems(Triscritti, 2013). Those changes were promoted under
a new framework of sustainable mining, which is often understood by the mining corporation as
only economic development that will outlast the life of a mining project (Kirsch, 2010).
Conga Project and Lagunas Norte are two mining projects with similar characteristics that
presented differences in the outcome of its development. Current efforts are being taken in Peru to
mitigate the effects of social conflict. For instance, some mining companies, like Southern Copper
Corporation (SCC), have developed on-the-ground teams of people who explain the benefits of
mining to local communities. In addition, the Peruvian government has passed legislature that
aim to protect the interests and demands of the local communities, especially through the Law of
Previous Consultation, which aims to gain support from the local indigenous communities before
the development of project that affects them. Finally, as this variation occurs at the sub-national
level, it is important to understand certain characteristics at the national level to better interpret the
results.
1Diario Gestion, “Levantan bloqueos en contra de minera Barrick tras dia´logo en Trujillo,” 27 February 2013.
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1.4 Understanding the Peruvian Context
I perform a sub-national analysis of protest activity in Peru, and it is important to first understand
the social and economic context at the national level. Peru is a country with extensive reserves
of mineral resources, but it has been described by its historians as a “beggar sitting on a bench
of gold.” 2 Despite all the potential assets that the country has, it has been unable to reach levels
of development proper of late-industrializing economies. Although economic growth has been
sustained in recent years, Peru is still one of the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin
America, and poverty is still concentrated amongst rural and indigenous communities (Figueroa,
2009).
1.4.1 The Economic Context
A rise in the number of protests followed the neoliberal reforms adopted by President Alberto Fu-
jimori on August 7, 1990 to stabilize the economy and bring inflation under control. During the
first administration of Alan Garcı´a (1985-1990), the economic situation in Peru was precarious, as
hyperinflation escalated from 1,722 percent in 1988 to 7,650 percent in 1990 (Crabtree, 1995). Un-
employment and underemployment levels skyrocketed and government social spending decreased
abruptly. Fujimori eliminated subsidies and reduced restrictions on trade, investment, and capital
flow (Crabtree, 1995). He also privatized hundreds of state-owned enterprises and replaced the
inflated currency, Inti, with the Nuevo Sol (PEN).
2This quote is attributed to the prominent Italian-born Peruvian geographer and scientist Antonio Raimondi.
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Figure 1.3: Neoliberal Policies and Economic Growth in Peru, 1990-2014
Source: Data from the World Bank, downloaded on March 29, 2016
The immediate effects of Fujishock appeared to be successful as it seemingly restored macroe-
conomic stability and promoted long-term growth in Peru. The country returned to full participa-
tion in the world trade and financial systems and inflation dropped to 139 percent by 1991 (Stokes,
2001). The graph in Figure 1.3 plots the relationship between the effect of neoliberal policies
adopted in Peru in the 1990s and economic growth. The adoption of neoliberalism is measured by
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is representative of the liberalization of the Peruvian econ-
omy, encouraging free trade and endorsing free market operations. Economic growth is measured
by GDP growth levels. Data on both economic measures come from the World Bank economic
indicators. This graph shows the immediate effects of the policies of the Fujishock at the beginning
of the 1990s. The negative economic growth increased from -0.54 percent in 1992 to 5.24 percent
in 2013. In the same years, FDI increased from -0.23 to 2.22 percent. Year 1994 was the peak
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for both indicators as FDI was 7.53 percent of GDP, and the GDP growth was almost 13 percent,
higher than any other country in the world (Stokes, 2001).
The economy was reactivated, in part, by higher demand for Peruvian exports, especially natu-
ral resources and minerals. Fujimori reformed the mining industry by passing the General Mining
Law (1992), which established investor-friendly legislation, thus making mining projects attractive
for foreign investment (Glave and Kuramoto, 2002). The General Mining Law enhanced Peru’s
global recognition as a center of mining expansion, but also introduced the canon minero, an in-
novative tax on mining companies, which allocated 20 percent of the profit tax paid by a mining
company to the territory where the profits were generated (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). 3 How-
ever, deceived by positive macroeconomic indicators, Fujimori’s government failed to modernize
Peru’s productive capacity, while reinforcing heavy reliance on primary-product exports.
The experience of Peru with the neoliberal scheme lays out the foundations for the eruption of
protests in Peru. Neoliberalism imposes severe material hardships on marginalized communities,
which include lower wages and cutbacks in social programs, but also produces grievances due to
environmental degradation, land expropriation, inadequate job opportunities, and decreasing pub-
lic expenditure in education and social benefits (Silva, 2009; Thorsen, 2010). After a decade of
intensive reforms, household surveys showed that 54.8 percent of the population was still below
the poverty line in 2000 (Silva, 2009). Even though reforms aimed to impose austerity, Peru did
not follow the same pattern as other Latin American economies, which protested against liberal-
ization policies. In fact, scholars considered Peru an example of “political quietism” in the wake
of neoliberalism in Latin America (Silva, 2009; Rice, 2012).
Although Fujimori’s shock therapy managed to control the economic crisis in the short term, it
reinforced the social and economic divisions between the sectors participating in the free market
and those marginalized communities, as poverty and unemployment remained threats to social
integration. Understanding social exclusion and further impoverishment in the context of economic
3Since 2004, the canon has amounted to 50 percent of the total income taxes paid by mining companies.
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liberalization contributes to the understanding of grievances.
1.4.2 The Social Context
The social context in Peru includes several notions of inequality and exclusion. Lack of integration
of indigenous communities and the exclusion of rural communities might be a ticking time bomb
of conflict in a highly diverse country like Peru.
In Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, Jose Carlos Maria´tegui (1928) wrote a com-
prehensive explanation of the Peruvian society. Even though the writings are from 1929, most
of the problems that Maria´tegui identified are still present today. Maria´tegui, the founder of the
Peruvian Communist Party in 1927, described an embedded division in Peruvian society and the
existence of “two versions of Peru:” one Peru that comprises the well-integrated and urban mid-
dle classes of Lima; and a “deep Peru”, which includes the peasantry and rural populations in the
Andes and the Amazon. Maria´tegui (1928) described Peru as a country that is largely rural, but
poorly integrated - both physically and socially - with relatively small middle and working classes.
Historically, Peru has maintained a significant rural population with an economy that was domi-
nated by the hacienda system, in which the masses worked the land that did not belong to them
(Maria´tegui, 1928). As a response to the disparities of the hacienda system, the Military Revo-
lutionary government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) implemented the Agrarian
Reform of 1969. The extensive land reform aimed to eliminate all large private landholdings or
haciendas, converting them into co- operatives owned by prior workers on the estates (Figueroa,
2009). Even though the reform was intended to destroy the basis of power of Peru’s traditional
elite, logistical problems and lack of enforcement hampered the noble goals of the reform. Instead,
redistribution only benefited the workers that were better-off, leaving the rest excluded from the
benefits of reform (Figueroa, 2009). The agrarian reform failed to redress the inequities that was
meant to amend.
This colonial system divided land and labor, reinforced the social exclusion of marginalized
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communities, and perpetuated perennial poverty, which currently affects 66 percent of the rural
population (Figueroa, 2009). Perpetuating a system of inequality that has exploited the rural pop-
ulations for centuries advances grievance theories, which recognize that anger, frustration, and
desire present an incentive to change the status quo (Olson and Hafer, 2001). Despite positive eco-
nomic performance, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported that inequality
remains high specially regarding infrastructure. In fact, water access in Peru was the most unequal
in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Klugman, 2010).
Lack of representation of indigenous communities sparks protest as was shown in the Baguazo,
a conflict that occurred in the province of Bagua, located in the Amazonas region. Following the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed between Peru and the United States in 2006, the adminis-
tration of Alan Garcı´a (2006-2011) opened the Amazon region for exploration and extraction of
hydrocarbons and mineral resources (Arce, 2014). Indigenous organizations in the Amazon, such
as the Inter-ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDISEP), met
the expansion of extractive activities with resistance. Contentious activities led to protests in 2008
and 2009 with the intention of repealing Garcı´a’s executive decree that opened the Amazon for de-
velopment. As a result of violent confrontations between the police and indigenous communities,
the Awajun and the Wampis, 23 police officers and 10 civilian protesters lost their lives in an event
that demonstrated the struggles for land and water. The Peruvian government declared a state of
emergency and sent the military to break up a local roadblock in Devil’s Curve, or la Curva del
Diablo, on June 5th, 2009. Natural resource conflict became evident in Bagua, and exemplified
the unequal relationship of power between the ruling classes in Lima and indigenous and rural
communities of the Andes highlands and Amazon forest.
In this context, Figueroa (2009) developed the “Exclusion Theory,” in which he argues that
peasant economic activities of subsistence agriculture remain largely excluded from policymaking
and the market economy. Therefore, economic growth that occurs in the capitalist sector does
not spread to the peasantry due to the lack of linkages between these two sub-systems (Figueroa,
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2009). The peasantry in rural areas is not only poor, but most of them do not speak Spanish, are
illiterate, and live in remote villages where the state does not have presence through institutions
(Figueroa, 2009). When explaining the wave of recent localized protests against market policies in
Latin America, Arce (2008) considered that rural villagers in Peru have been the most important
social forces opposing the continuation of neoliberal policies, as opposed to indigenous movements
in Ecuador and Bolivia, and the unemployed in Argentina (Arce, 2008).
Figueroa (2009) considers that property rights are essential to the efficient functioning of the
market system, as lack of secure property rights are determinants of social inequality. Lack of prop-
erty rights enlarge an informal economy with disadvantaged workers without rights and benefits
(De Soto, 2000). One example of the relationship between lack of property rights and exclusion
refers to the economic policies adopted by President Alan Garcı´a during his first administration
(1985-1990). He was convinced that foreign private investment had a positive impact on poverty
reduction, thus granting land concessions for oil and gas exploration, mining, and logging to big
multinational corporations, such as Brazil’s Petrobras (Economist, 2009). These concessions were
superimposed on towns and villages creating conflict as investment had surpassed private and
communal property. Even though Peruvian governments have implemented land titling programs,
those titles have benefited mostly people living in urban areas. In rural areas, fewer than half of
landowners have titles proving their ownership (Figueroa, 2009). Villagers and farmers are con-
stantly threatened by land invasions and government concessions to multinational corporations.
These concessions are only possible due to the absence of legal ownership and insecure property
rights in rural areas (De Soto, 2000).
In Peru, the quest for property rights became relevant when massive migration from rural to
urban areas occurred as product of a period of internal violence due to terrorism in the 1980s,
populating the outskirts of cities like Lima and Arequipa (De Soto, 2000). Peru moved from being
a predominantly rural country to an urban country in the last few decades. According to the World
Bank, in 1966, only 53 percent of the population lived in cities. The number increased to 78.3
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percent in 2014. Massive migration had an impact on the social, economic, political, and cultural
integration of the country. The social context of division and exclusion provides a framework at
the national level to understand the analysis at the sub-national level.
1.5 Plan of the Thesis
The following thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes and analyzes the liter-
ature on protest and collective action. In Chapter 1, I describe the way and the will to protest.
Drawing from the literature on collective action, grievances theory, political opportunities theory,
and resource mobilization theory, I analyze the framework that explains the onset of protest at the
sub-national level in Peru and its variation across provinces.
Chapter 2 explores an empirical relationship between protest, mining, and agriculture in Peru.
I present in this chapter systematic evidence to answer the question: What explains variation in
protest activity surrounding mining projects in Peru? Using an original dataset assembled from
different institutions of the Peruvian government, I run a logit and OLS regressions to determine
an empirical relationship among the outcomes of interest.
Chapter 3 presents a case study of the Tı´a Marı´a mining project, located in the Province of
Islay, in the region of Arequipa. The Tı´a Marı´a mining project has been controversial due to its
potential negative environmental impact. Protests occurred in April 2011 and continued in 2015,
when anti-mining opposition began an indefinite strike. I conducted a field study in the Tambo
Valley in May 2016 to interview villagers regarding their opinions of the mining project. I use this
case study to validate the systematic results presented in Chapter 2, by analyzing the conditions
that sparked protest activity in the Tambo Valley in 2015.
Chapter 4 concludes with the findings and discussion from the empirical analysis, as well as
lessons from the case study in the Tambo Valley. I lay out the ongoing research agenda regarding
the relationship among protest, mining and agriculture in Peru.
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1.6 Conclusion
I conduct a sub-national analysis of Peru regarding protest activity in relation to mining activities
and agriculture. I explored the Peruvian social and economic context, especially regarding the
exclusion of indigenous and rural communities (Figueroa, 2009), the relationship between peoples
and the environment (Walsh, 2010; Gudynas, 2011), and the neoliberal policies adopted by Presi-
dent Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, which boosted economic growth and foreign direct investment
in natural resource extraction activities (Bebbington et al., 2007). In a context in which protests
are widespread, this project will add nuance to the current debate between economic growth and
extractive practices in mining countries like Peru.
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Chapter 2
Theories of Protest
What causes variation in protest across mining projects in Peru? Scholarly work on protest is
extensive, but studies on Peru remain limited and focus on the grievances of social actors and the
political conditions that allow mobilization (Arce, 2014; Yanguas, 2010; Bebbington and Bury,
2013), as opposed to explaining the spatial and cross-temporal variation of protest events at the
sub-national level. Existing studies mainly focus on the question: Why do people protest? This
puzzle is outside the scope of my thesis.
I analyze four different theoretical frameworks that explain both the will and the way of protest:
grievance theories, collective action theories, political opportunities theories, and resource mobi-
lization perspectives. A combination of these theories is necessary to have a framework to explain
protest at the sub-national level, including spatial and cross-temporal variation (McAdam et al.,
1996). McAdam et al. (1996) consider that when political conditions are favorable, actors can
canalize their grievances from economic liberalization in order to build a coalition of civil society
to mobilize and change the status quo.
Theories of protest consider different understandings of the concept of protest itself. Some
definitions describe protest as any action or claim expressing disapproval by a group of more
than two people separate from the organs of the state against economic and/or political elites and
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institutions (Arce, 2014). However, I would use a more comprehensive definition of protest that
arises after an analysis of different interpretations. Opp (2009) defines protest as collective action
of individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target. This
definition considers two important factors: collective action and goals. Collective action refers
to coordinated actions of several individuals. Protest differs from other types of collective action
as protesters cannot influence the outcome themselves, such as providing a public good, as they
depend on third parties, such as the government, to change the status quo.
2.1 Collective Action Theories
The literature on collective actions counts Olson’s logic of collective action as its milestone work.
It focuses on people’s inability to overcome both coordination and cooperation problems (Olson,
1971). The ability or inability to coordinate is part of the collective action problem, since no
coordination would present a failure to achieve a desired common outcome (Opp, 2009).
Cooperation problems refer to the “free rider” problem when members of a group act as ratio-
nal persons who would rather consume a public good without the burden of the costs of obtaining
it. The group size proposition considers that the larger the group, the less likely the public good
is provided. However, if it is provided it is due to the existence of selective incentives: benefits
occurring when one contributes and costs occurring when one defects (Olson, 1971). The assump-
tion of the theory is that rational and self-interested individuals do not contribute to attain common
goals (Olson, 1971). Rational individuals compare the costs and benefits of their actions, and their
behavior is governed by utility-maximization (Olson, 1971). Olson considers that the costs of par-
ticipating to achieve a common goal, usually the provision of public goods, are higher than the
benefits (Olson, 1971). By definition, public goods are non-rival and non-excludable, thus repre-
senting a common interest. The criterion of non-exclusion allows those who did not contribute to
the provision of public goods, to also consume and enjoy such goods.
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Collective Action theories help explain coordination and cooperation. Protests in the wake of
mining projects are not usually isolated individual actions, but rather joint actions. I witnessed
collective action during my field work in towns that host the mining project Tı´a Marı´a in the
province of Islay in southern Peru, when I saw a green-light banner with the message “Agro Si,
Mina no” across many houses. Leadership in coordination is important, as it solves coordination
and cooperation issues, as well as lowering the costs of collective action (Opp, 2009). In an attempt
to understand why people did participate in a protest, I will summarize grievance theories, political
opportunities theory, and resource mobilization theory.
2.2 Grievance Theories
Many scholars have conducted studies on the relationship between protest and inequality, arguing
that grievances lead to more political participation, including contentious activities (Gurney and
Tierney, 1982; Gurr, 1970). Scholars recognize that feelings such as anger, frustration, and re-
sentment about injustice could lead people to protest (della Porta and Diani, 2006); and influence
protest participation separately from rational cost-benefit calculations (Opp, 2009; Stu¨rmer and
Simon, 2009). In addition, a section of the literature on protest activity has shown that some peo-
ple also protest motivated by grievances, even without resources and organization (Scacco, 2008).
Empirical evidence also suggests that grievances have a causal effect on social movements partici-
pation, but not a direct effect on protest (Opp, 2009, 1988). Critics of grievance theories claim that
people do not only protest when they are upset, but when they overcome the free-rider problem
and are able to coordinate collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 2002; Klandermans, 1984). This
is interesting in the case of the Peruvian context, where protests occurred only in certain mining
projects but not in others.
“Basic needs deprivation” is considered a especially salient grievance when poverty delays
economic development (Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek, 2007). In the Peruvian case, poverty is
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still widespread among indigenous communities of the Andean highlands and the Amazon jungle.
Poverty affects 22.7 percent of the total population in the country, but affects 66 percent of the ru-
ral population (Figueroa, 2009). Under those circumstances of poverty and deprivation, people are
likely to provoke radical demands for redistributive preferences (Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek,
2007). Other scholars have described protest as an expression of “moral outrage” from perceived
economic deprivation or political oppression (Martin, Brickman and Murray, 1983). The dissat-
isfaction of individuals with their economic situation could relinquish the risks associated with
violent collective action, as they perceive a gap between their expectations and the potential to ful-
fill them (Gurr, 1970). Silva (2009) considers that grievances are primordial for the mobilization
of social actors. Those grievances were expanded with the development of extractive economy
projects or megaproyectos, which demanded greater need for water and land, thus exasperating
conflict with local communities.
Grievance theories are understood in the context of the development of a mining project in
Peru. Arce (2016) argues that individuals who perceive the impact of mining to agriculture to be
detrimental, are likely to oppose a mining project; likewise, those who perceive a positive impact
of mining, including distribution of revenue from extractions, are likely to support the development
of a mining project.
2.3 Political Opportunity Theories
The structure of political opportunities refers to the political environment that corresponds to the
“context within which politics takes place” (Eisinger, 1973, 11). Some factors include the level
of community resources and the level of citizen political activity. Eisinger (1973) considers that
protest is a function of political opportunities, which could be liner or curvilinear. First, in the
linear model, there is a negative relationship between the political opportunities and protest, as in-
creasing opportunities reduce protest behavior (Eisinger, 1973). Second, in the curvilinear model,
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if opportunities are low, protest is absent; increasing opportunities raises protest; but when op-
portunities exceed a certain value, protest declines (Eisinger, 1973). In the curvilinear model,
Eisinger assumes that rising expectations are related to impatience, and could generate discontent
until demands are met, thus decreasing protest (Eisinger, 1973).
Peru presented a case of “political quietism” during the 1990s, when in many Latin America
countries, protests erupted in response to economic liberalization policies, including Argentina
(Murillo and Ronconi, 2004) and Bolivia (Kohl, 2002). Even though, Peru opened up to mining
activities during the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), especially with
the adoption of the General Mining Law (1992), protest activity was not widespread. This theory
offers the framework to understand that during Fujimori’s regime, the political opportunity struc-
ture weakened collective action as it persistently delegitimized protest (Roberts, 1996; Tanaka,
2002). Following the fall of Fujimori in 2000, the political opportunity structure was more fa-
vorable to mobilization (Arce, 2008; McAdam and Tarrow, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Grompone and
Tanaka, 2013).
Although Peru presented some cases of social protests in the 1990s and early 2000s, these
events have been characterized by scholars as scattered and with minimal national importance
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2008). Scholars have also considered that protests in Peru, due to their frag-
mentation, did not achieve an scale-shift phenomenon, coined by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
(2001), while explaining the situation in which isolated instances of contentious activities trans-
form intro growing streams of mobilization (Arce, 2014).
2.4 Resource Mobilization Theory
Protest does not occur in all places where people are upset. Resource mobilization theorists aban-
doned earlier theories of collective action that were based on perceptions of grievances and depri-
vation, as grievances always exist and therefore cannot explain the ups and downs of protest cycles
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(Corning and Myers, 2002). Therefore, resource mobilization theory emphasizes the opportunity
rather than the desire to protest. Scholars argue that people protest because they are able to coordi-
nate collective action and overcome the free-rider problem, focusing on the processes of resource
accumulation, beyond membership consciousness and manpower, that may become available to
potential movements to produce action and achieve their goals (McCarthy and Zald, 2002, 1973,
1977; Klandermans, 1984; Corning and Myers, 2002; Jenkins, 1983; Tilly, 1978). These resources
support the growth and vitality of movements and movement organizations.
Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the ability of a movement to acquire resources and
mobilize people towards accomplishing the movement’s goals. In the literature, resource is not
well explained, and rather understood as just goods that individual or collective actors can control
(Opp, 2009, 139). Mobilization is understood as the process by which a group secures collective
control over the resources needed for collective action (Jenkins, 1983, 532).
The resource mobilization perspective is often contingent to “scope conditions” (McCarthy
and Zald, 1977, 2002). These conditions include a free society that allows freedom of assembly,
freedom of speech, and where mass media are able to report protests and grievances (McCarthy
and Zald, 1977; Opp, 2009). The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support
and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must
be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements
upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate
movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that there is ambiguous evidence to assess that grievances
and related deprivation are key variables in explaining protest behavior. Therefore, in this the-
ory, authors do not disregard the role of grievances, but rather stress the structural conditions that
facilitate their expression (McCarthy and Zald, 1973).
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I summarized four theories from the available literature regarding the onset of
protest, including grievance theories, collective action theories, political opportunities theory and
resource mobilizations theory. I use all of these theories, with particular attention to Resource
Mobilization Theory, to provide a framework to understand the variation of protest at the sub-
national level in Peru. The literature on collective actions could help answer questions like: Why
do some people decided to engage in protest as opposed to other types of collective action? Why
do protests turn violent? Meanwhile, both political opportunities theory and resource mobilization
theory stress the structural conditions that facilitate the expression of grievances, as grievances
themselves are unable to explain the onset of protest.
A combination of exclusion theories, the relationship of harmony with nature, grievances, col-
lective action, and resource mobilization theory motivate my hypothesis. Agriculture has been the
primary economic activity of rural populations and it seems that the announcement of a mining
project in areas that are mostly agricultural may spark protest activity.
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Chapter 3
Empirical study of mining protests
In this chapter, I analyze the variation of protest activity at the sub-national level in Peru. Following
the particular characteristics of the social and economic context at the national level, combined the
with framework on protest activity provided by the available literature on protest, I analyze the
relationship between protest, agriculture, and mining. What explains variation in protest frequency
across mining projects in Peru? By using an OLS regression and a logit regression, I examine
the interaction between agricultural importance and a mining announcement in determining the
likelihood of protest across provinces in Peru. Sub-national analysis facilitates statistical testing of
theoretical arguments.
Both mining and agriculture rely on the use of water and land, so the expansion of the mining
sector might play a role in creating social conflict over livelihood assets and social relationships
in farming communities. Tensions over quantity and quality of water have been seemingly aggra-
vated by the neoliberal economic model and extractive industries that prioritize economic growth
over environmental sustainability (Shiva, 2016). In Peru, the World Gold Council (2012) reported
extractive activities as a substantial contributor to outstanding economic growth rates. In fact, 70
percent of the country’s exports in 2007 came from extractive industries (Bebbington, 2009).
Several studies have reported that mining activities pollute rivers, lakes, air, and land, thus
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fomenting the onset of conflict in areas where agriculture is another important economic activity.
(Arce, 2014; Bebbington, Bebbington and Bury, 2010; Bury, 2005; De Echave, 2011; De Echave
et al., 2009; Himley, 2010; Gil, 2009; Salas Carreno, 2008; Aroca, 2008). In this context, oppos-
ing arguments appeared regarding the “resource curse”. While some scholars have argued that
natural resource extraction has negative consequences for economic development, civil war, and
democracy at the national level (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2001); others have found posi-
tive effects (Haber and Menaldo, 2011). However, most of the studies analyze the effects of natural
resource extraction at the national level, with some exceptions that explore it systematically at the
sub-national level. For instance, Arellano-Yanguas (2011; 2008) demonstrated the existence of a
local resource curse, because in Peru social conflict arises mostly in areas where natural resource
extraction occurs.
The existing literature argues that natural resources, including minerals, represent “structurally
significant” resources in a country’s economic development and state building (Selby, 2005). Em-
pirical studies have demonstrated that natural resource extraction affects rural and impoverished
communities, producing grievances relating to land expropriation, pollution, environmental degra-
dation, and inadequate job opportunities (Arce, 2014). Several studies have shown that the ex-
pansion of the mining industry has contributed to the onset of contentious activities across Latin
American countries. This expansion has been described by scholars as “new mining,” and include
changes in the pace and scale of the project development, as well as an increase in the interaction
between extraction and investment (Bebbington, 2009). “New mining” has increased the need for
water, land, and energy, while decreasing the need for unskilled labor as technological conditions
have improved (Arce, 2014). Rural populations are then affected by the mining extraction.
I wrote a Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP) and registered it with my advisor, Professor Lisa Mueller, in
December 2016. The PAP has the objective of holding my scholarly work accountable, preventing
ethical breaches. In order to test the hypothesis that this thesis outlines to the best of my abilities,
I have provided all the information necessary, including datasets and methods, before running any
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empirical analysis. Following the models registered in the PAP, I have only tested the hypothesis
provided and I have only used the variables presented. A PAP allows to thoroughly consider the
implications of my research work, devise ways to minimize risks, and provide detailed protocols
to the Institutional Review Boards (IRB) of Macalester College.
3.1 Hypothesis
The specific hypothesis to be tested is:
• H: A mining company’s announcement of the creation or advancement of a mining project
in Peru has a greater effect on the likelihood of protest, if the mining project is in a mostly
agricultural province.
Rationale: Both mining and agriculture rely on the use of water for their performance.
Mining activities pollute rivers, lakes, air, and arable land, thus fomenting the onset of social
conflict in areas where agriculture is another important economic activity.
Observable Implications: Provinces with high levels of agriculture would have more so-
cial conflicts after the announcement of a new mine than those regions in which agriculture is
not an important economic activity. If this hypothesis is true, I should observe the following
implications:
1. Provinces with a significant percentage of agricultural land are more likely to experi-
ence protests in the wake of the announcement of a mining project than those provinces
where the percentage of arable land is low.
2. Provinces where the percentage of the population working in mining activities is larger
than the percentage of the population working in agricultural activities are more likely
to experience protests in the wake of the announcement of a mining project than those
provinces where the percentage of the population working in agriculture is larger.
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3. Provinces where the percentage of the regional GDP coming from agricultural activities
is larger than the percentage of the GDP coming from mining activities are more likely
to experience protests in the wake of the announcement of a mining project than those
provinces where the percentage of regional GDP coming from the population working
in agriculture is larger.
3.2 Models and Estimation Strategy
In order to test my hypothesis, I first estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is di-
chotomous, and a value of 1 is assigned if a protest occurred surrounding a mining project in
that particular province in that particular year, and the value of 0 otherwise. I use the following
structural equation:
Protestit = β0 + β1αit + β2δit-1 + β3αitδit-1 + σ + it (3.1)
In this equation, β0 is the intercept term. β1 is the coefficient of the main effect for agricultural
importance (α) at province i at year t. β2 is the coefficient of the main effect for the mining
company’s announcement of the creation or advancement of a particular mining project (δ) in
province i at year t. β3 is the coefficient of an interaction term involving two variables described
above: agricultural importance (αit) and the announcement of a mining project (δt-1). σ represents
the control variables of a province located in a particular region. Finally it is the random error.
I also run a OLS regression model where the dependent variable is continuous depending of
the number of protests related to mining activities occurred in a particular province in the given
year. I use the following structural equation:
Protestit = β0 + β1αit + β2δit-1 + β3αitδit-1 + σ + it (3.2)
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3.3 Data and Variables
The dataset I created is composed of four different databases from different institutions within
the Peruvian government. I work with the latest available data sources found. However, some of
the data, especially that regarding agricultural measures of arable land and agricultural land are
from 2012. I do not expect a significant change in the amount of arable land in the last 5 years.
Furthermore, I found a limitation in the available data to measure the outcomes of interest since
I identify social desirability bias in the government datasets. Data come from different surveys
and census carried by government officials or government enumerators. Especially regarding the
information that came from household surveys, respondents might exaggerate or hide information
if they think that it could increase taxes. Moreover, I find a limitation in the number of cases of
protest activity, since the monthly reports have been produced by government institutions, based
on the cases that have been reported. Finally, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, I do not include a
measure that accounts for the relationship of harmony with nature or Sumac Kawsay, so I expect
Omitted-variable bias in my data.
3.3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable (DV) is protest activity in a given province in Peru. In the logit regression,
the DV is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a protest occurred in the wake a mining
project in that province in that year, and the value of 0 otherwise. In the OLS regression, the DV is
a continuous dependent variable, which refers to the number of protests that occurred in the wake
of a mining project in a province in a particular year.
I use Peruvian provinces as my unit of analysis. There are currently 196 provinces distributed
across 25 regions in Peru. I have only considered 195 provinces for this study, since the province
of Putumayo in the region of Loreto was only created on May 5, 2014 and there is not yet reliable
data. Ancash is the region with the most provinces and it has 20 of them. Callao is considered
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a region with only one province with the same name. Lima, the capital, represents a particular
case because it is divided in both Lima Metropolitana and Lima Provincias, but for the purpose of
analysis I consider both divisions under the same region, which I refer as Lima.
Data on protest activity come from the Annual Report on Social Conflict, which is prepared
by the Peruvian Ombudsman’ Office. Data include annual reports for five consecutive years, from
2011 to 2015. The Ombudsman’s Office has data for previous years starting in 2006, but this data
was under review and could not be shared at the time of writing my paper. In 2015, 260 cases of
social protests were reported across the national territory. Data on protest activity are limited at the
sub-national level, but the information provided by the Ombudsman’s office fulfills the definition
of protest that I use in this research paper and I borrow from Opp: collective actions aimed at
achieving a goal by influencing decisions of a target (Opp, 2009).
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Figure 3.1: Map of Peru with frequency of protests in mining projects, 2011-2015
Source: Source: Data come from the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office Annual Report on Social
Conflict, 2016. Cumulative frequency distribution of protest covers a five-year period (2011-2015)
and includes 195 provinces in Peru. Data only include observations of protest related to mining
activities.
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The Ombudsman’s office coded protest activities by district, province, and region. It also
included two extra measures at the national level and multiregional level. Multiregional protests
occurred in two or more provinces, which could be located in different regions. For instance, in
2015 there were protests registered in the area of the Lake Chinchaycocha, which recorded protests
happening in the provinces of Ondores, Carhuamayo, and Junı´n located in the Junı´n region, but
also in Ninacaca and Vicco, located in the Pasco region. Therefore, I include these cases in the
analysis because they show variation across provinces. I will not consider national protests because
they are not particular to a specific province.
The map in Figure 3.1 plots the cumulative frequency distribution of protests related to mining
activities that occurred across 195 provinces in Peru between 2011 and 2015. Following an analysis
of the data, I display in white provinces that have not had any protest activity in the wake of
a mining project. I display in two shades of gray the provinces that had between 1 and 5, and
6-15 protests respectively. Finally, I display in black provinces that presented over 16 conflicts,
including the provinces of Huari (29 cases) and Cotabambas (23 cases).
3.3.2 Independent variable
The main independent variable (IV) is the interaction between agricultural importance and a min-
ing company’s announcement of the creation or advancement of a particular mining project.
I use the percentage of agricultural land in a particular province as a measure of agricultural
importance. Data on agricultural importance come from the IV National Census of Agriculture,
released in 2012 by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). This information
derives from household surveys, which included measures for arable land and agricultural land at
the national, regional, provincial, and district level. I only consider the area at the provincial level
in square kilometers (sqkm). I use agricultural land as measures of the importance of agriculture in
a particular province, as it encompasses different areas used for agricultural purposes. According
to the Food and Agriculture Organization (Food and of the United Nations, 1997), agricultural area
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is the sum of the following areas:
1. Arable land: land under temporary agricultural crops, temporary meadows for mowing or
pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and land temporarily fallow.
2. Permanent crops: land cultivated with long-term crops which do not have to be replanted for
several years (i.e. coffee); land under trees and shrubs producing flowers.
3. Permanent meadows and pastures: land used permanently (five years or more) to grow
herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild (wild prairie or grazing land).
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Agricultural Land (log) across provinces in Peru
Source: Data from IV Censo Nacional Agropecuario 2012 , downloaded on January 2, 2017
Figure 3.2 shows the density of percentage of agricultural land across provinces in Peru. I
take the log of the measure of agricultural land to have a more normal distribution. Provinces like
Ambo and Yarowilca in Huanuco had over half of their territory being agricultural land.
The second part of the interaction term refers to a mining company’s announcement of the
creation or advancement of a particular mining project, which I will measure using the information
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of the Cartera Estimada de Proyectos Mineros, published every year by the Peruvian Ministry
of Mining and Energy (MINEM). This variable is dichotomous and a value of 1 is given if an
announcement about the advancement or creation of a particular mining project occurred in the
previous year in a particular province, and a value of 0 otherwise. I take the log of announcement
to have a normal distribution.
Data come from the Cartera Estimada de Proyectos Mineros (portfolio of mining projects),
published every year by the Peruvian Ministry of Mining and Energy (MINEM). In this report
MINEM presents all the announcements made by mining companies regarding the status of a
particular mining project. There are four categories for the announcement of the status of a mining
project:
1. Expansion of projects in operation
2. Projects with approved Environmental Impact Studies (EIA)
3. Projects with EIA in evaluation
4. Exploratory stage of the project
3.3.3 Control variables
GDP per capita
Data on GDP per capita at the regional level come from the report Peru: Producto Bruto Interno
por Departamentos 2007-2015. The information for this economic indicator is not available at the
provincial level, so I consider this measure at the regional level and applied it to every province
located in that particular region. I use GDP per capita as a proxy for the economic grievances that
might increase protest activity. I take the log of GDP per capita to have a normal distribution.
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Economic distribution
This variable measures the ratio of GDP in a particular province, dividing the GDP coming from
agriculture by the GDP coming from mining activities. This distribution is a continuous variable
that represents the importance of each economic activity.
Labor distribution
This variable measures the employment distribution between mining and agriculture based on the
Economically Active Population (EPA) in every region. Data come from Boletı´n Especial No
21: Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Poblacio´n total y edades quinquenales, segu´n Departamento,
Provincia y Distrito, 2005-2015. This distribution is a continuous variable that is a ratio between
agricultural and mining workers.
Density
Measure of the number of habitants per square kilometer in a particular province. More populated
provinces would experience higher levels of mobilization compared to less populated provinces
(Arce, 2014).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for all variables
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Protest 975 0.66 0.48 0 1
Protest (number) 975 1.65 1.81 0 11
Mining protest 975 0.39 0.49 0 1
Mining protest (number) 975 0.70 1.18 0 7
GDP per capita 970 13,698 6,722 7,001 47,564
Unemployment 975 2.97 0.93 1.30 5.90
Ratio GDP 975 5.11 12.32 0.09 52.67
Ratio labor 975 2,538.63 10,714.70 1.67 48,600
Area 975 6,575.49 12,208.26 146.98 119,859
Population 975 152,010 618,084 3,746 8,481,415
Density 975 86.23 528.89 0.21 6,686.62
Agricultural land (total) 975 1,986.79 2,115.18 8.01 12,041.42
Agricultural (percent) 975 0.45 0.29 0.01 2.12
Arable land (total) 975 365.39 299.30 0.44 1,623.31
Arable (percent) 975 0.12 0.12 0 1.07
Announcement 975 0.18 0.39 0 1
Announcement (number) 975 0.25 0.59 0 4
3.4 Findings
Table 3.2 displays the estimation results for the logit regression with a dummy variable for protest
activity surrounding mining projects. Model 1 presents variables that are expected to explain
protest activity. The coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant, sug-
gesting that an increase in GDP is associated with an increase in the likelihood of protest. This
relationship is not consistent with the literature on grievances that shows that higher income is
associated with less protest. The coefficient for density is negative and statistically significant,
showing that a unit increase in density is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of protest.
This results suggests that protest is less likely to happen when there are more people, suggesting
coordination problems in more populated areas, being inconsistent with the literature that suggests
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that in rural areas, residents are theoretically more likely than urban residents to face collective
action problems as they are geographically dispersed and excluded from technological networks
(Olson, 1971). Rural residents are also geographically farther from the government, which is the
typical target of protests.
Model 2 includes one of the main effects of the interaction term, agricultural importance mea-
sured by the Log of Agricultural land, which has a positive and statistically significant relationship
with protest activity. A unit increase in the amount of agricultural land is associated with an in-
crease in the likelihood of protest. This relationship is consistent with the literature that identifies
a conflict between mining activities and agricultural activities. Model 3 includes the other main
effect, Announcement (dummy), which also has a positive and statistically significant relationship
with protest activity, also showing that mining activities on average spark the onset of protest.
Model 4 introduces the main independent variable-the interaction between agricultural impor-
tance and a mining company’s announcement. The coefficient of the interaction term Agricul-
ture*Mine becomes negative and statistically significant. Therefore, if the a mining company’s
announcement happens in a mostly agricultural province, the evidence suggests that the likelihood
of protest decreases and the results are significant, holding all variables constant. This negative
relationship is inconsistent with the literature, suggesting challenges to collective action in rural
areas in Peru often related to the role of leadership in social movements.
Model 5 includes the control variables that measure the ratio between mining and agriculture
in both GDP (Log of GDP ratio) and labor distribution (Log of Labor ratio). Both control vari-
ables are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a unit increase in the importance of
agriculture at the regional level is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of protest.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) −1.141∗ −2.494∗∗∗ −0.422 −1.528∗∗ 0.052
(0.468) (0.487) (0.443) (0.470) (0.512)
Log of GDP per capita 0.173∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.085 0.121∗ −0.018
(0.054) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055)
Unemployment rate 0.002 −0.000 0.015 0.016 −0.001
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
Log of Density −0.031∗ 0.001 −0.036∗∗ −0.011 −0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log of Agricultural Land 0.113∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Announcement (dummy) 0.442∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.309) (0.302)
Agriculture*Mine −0.110∗∗ −0.117∗∗
(0.042) (0.041)
Log of GDP ratio −0.060∗∗
(0.023)
Log of Labor ratio −0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
AIC 1351.363 1295.414 1227.930 1187.585 1139.759
BIC 1375.750 1324.678 1257.194 1226.603 1188.532
Log Likelihood -670.682 -641.707 -607.965 -585.792 -559.880
Deviance 226.392 213.263 198.930 190.041 180.154
Num. obs. 970 970 970 970 970
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.2: Logit Estimation Results for Agricultural Importance in Protest Activity
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Table 3.3 displays the estimation results for the OLS regression. Model 1 only includes eco-
nomic indicators and demographic controls. Coefficients in Model 1 are not statistically signifi-
cant. GDP per capita has a positive effect on the level of protest activity. This relationship is also
incoherent with the literature on grievances that shows that higher income is associated with less
protest. Both density and unemployment rate have negative coefficients.
Model 2 includes one of the main effects of the interaction term, agricultural importance. Log
of Agricultural Land has a positive and statistically significant relationship with protest activity.
This relationship is consistent with the literature that identifies a conflict between mining activities
and agricultural activities, as the model suggests that an increase in agricultural land is associated
with an increase in protest frequency.
Model 3 includes the other main effect, Announcement, which measures a mining company’s
announcement regarding the status of a mining project. Similar to the other main effect, the rela-
tionship between a mining announcement and protest activity is positive and significant, showing
that mining activities on average spark the onset of protest.
Model 4 introduces the main independent variable, which is the interaction between agricultural
importance and a mining company’s announcement. The main effects and the coefficient become
negative and significant. Therefore, if an announcement happens in a mostly agricultural province,
the evidence suggests that the number of protest decreases. These results are not statistically
significant. This negative relationship is not what I expected, especially after confirming that both
main effects have a positive relationship with protest, suggesting a challenge to collective action in
rural areas.
Model 5 includes the control variables that measure the ratio between mining and agriculture in
GDP and labor distribution. Both coefficients are negative, and only GDP ratio between agriculture
and mining is significant. Model 6 includes Clustered Standard Errors (CSE) at the regional level,
in order to capture aspects corresponding to a particular cluster group, which in this case is any of
the 25 regions in Peru.
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Figure 3.3: OLS Estimation Results for Agricultural Importance in Protest Activity
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) −1.141∗ −1.345∗∗ −0.422 −0.511 0.784
(0.468) (0.493) (0.443) (0.469) (0.506)
Log of GDP per capita 0.173∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.085 0.088 −0.024
(0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.052) (0.056)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.014 −0.022
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Log of Density −0.031∗ −0.034∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log of arable land 0.022 0.013 0.034∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Announcement 0.442∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗ 0.871∗∗
(0.038) (0.276) (0.269)
Agriculture*Mine −0.052 −0.080
(0.048) (0.047)
Log of GDP ratio −0.032
(0.023)
Log of Labor ratio −0.058∗∗∗
(0.012)
AIC 1351.363 1351.623 1227.930 1230.556 1177.199
BIC 1375.750 1380.887 1257.194 1269.574 1225.972
Log Likelihood -670.682 -669.812 -607.965 -607.278 -578.600
Deviance 226.392 225.986 198.930 198.649 187.243
Num. obs. 970 970 970 970 970
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.3: Logit Estimation Results for Arable land in Protest Activity
41
3.5 Robustness
To see whether the effects of agriculture are consistent, I replace agricultural land with arable land
as a measure of agricultural importance. The table in Figure 3.3 plots the results from a logit model
that replaces Agricultural Land with Arable Land, showing a negative but statistically significant
relationship for the interaction between mining and agriculture. This model with arable land shows
a similar pattern to previous models with agricultural land, displaying the positive relationship of
the main effects, but the negative relationship of the interaction term.
3.6 Discussion
The results suggest that when a mining company announces the change of status of a mining
project, and this announcement occurs in a mostly agricultural province, the likelihood of protest
decreases. These results are not consistent with the literature on protest activity and social move-
ments, which say that protest is more difficult to achieve in rural areas, because of a lack of collec-
tive action, thus making it more complicated to overcome coordination problems (Olson, 1971).
In this thesis, the evidence suggests that in Peru, protest tends to be a rural phenomenon because
the main effect for agricultural importance is positive and significant. An interesting phenomenon
occurring in this relationship is that agricultural provinces have more protest, as well as places
where a mining project is announced. In an attempt to further explain this relationship, in the next
chapter I explore the case study of a mining company in which the announcement of a mining
project sparked the onset of protest.
Another important factor to discuss is that mining companies have learned about their previous
mistakes in facilitating the onset of protest. For instance, Arce (2014) argues that mining compa-
nies provide selective rewards to the leaders of protest organizations, such as bribes or employment
opportunities, in order to diffuse the demands of protesters. Furthermore, mining companies have
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started investing in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), including high-profile projects that win
the support of the population through concessions (Arce, 2014).
3.7 Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations affecting this study. First, the unit of analysis of this project has been
limited by the lack of available and reliable data. For instance, the Office of the Ombudsman in
Peru has data regarding social conflicts only since 2004, but was only able to share their datasets
since 2011 until 2015 since the remaining data is under review.
Second, I estimate Omitted-variables bias (OVB) regarding the lack of measures for the in-
digenous relationship with nature, which was explained in Chapter 1. In addition, I also estimate
Reporting Bias as all of the data has been collected by the Peruvian government and its different
institutions. Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, people might hide or exaggerate information if they
expect an increase in taxes.
Finally, as protests have occurred recently, it is still early to assess their impact and I still rely
on government data to determine the existence of protest. A better measure for the DV would have
been create an original dataset that accounted for information on protest that the author collects
based on archival research in local newspapers and mining company’s websites.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the empirical relationships between protest, mining, and agricultural
activities using a logit regression and a OLS regression. Data for the analysis came from an original
dataset compiled from different sources from the Peruvian government, including a census on
agricultural land by INEI, estimates of the mining production by MINEM, and a recollection of
protest activity by the Ombudsman’s Office. I tested the hypothesis about the likelihood of protest
43
activity in the wake of mining projects in mostly agricultural provinces in Peru. I estimated that
protest is more likely to happen, on average, if a mining company announces the development or
expansion of a mining project in a mostly agricultural province.
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Chapter 4
A case study of mining and agriculture
In this chapter, I explore the case of the Tı´a Marı´a mining project. Even though the results of the
empirical analysis suggested a negative relationship between the announcement of a mining project
in a mostly agricultural province and the likelihood of protest, this case study describes the situation
of an announcement that did spark protest. The copper-project is located in the adjacent areas to
the Tambo Valley, a highly productive agricultural zone in the province of Islay in Arequipa. In
2015, the government declared a state of emergency following the violent protests that took place
showing opposition to the development of the mining project. Thousands of policemen and soldiers
were sent to the Tambo Valley, constitutional rights suspended, more than 200 people injured and
7 people dead. The analysis of this section is based on the field study I conducted in the districts of
Dea´n Valdivia, Cocachacra, La Curva, and El Fiscal, doing interviews with local villagers in May
2016.
Blattman and Miguel (2010) recognize the strengths of integrating cross-country statistical
work, which in this case is cross-province analysis, with a historical-political case analysis. This
combination aims to minimize the weaknesses of both approaches. Scholars have recognized that
single case studies have the potential to illustrate causal mechanisms, generate new hypotheses, and
stimulate innovative data collection (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Therefore, I use the case study
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of the Tı´a Marı´a mining project to illustrate causal mechanisms for the relationship established
between protest, mining.
4.1 Background
Natural resource extraction has contributed to an impressive economic expansion in the Peruvian
economy (Arce, 2014). Mining activities contributed to this economic performance, and in 2011
alone, mining exports represented 59 percent of all of Peru’s exports (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2016).
According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), the total mining production in Peru was
USD 64,590.00 millions per year in 2011 (MINEM, 2014). Record-high commodity prices and the
growing Chinese demand for raw materials boosted Peruvian economic growth (Arce, 2016). For
instance, Peru grew by 9.8 percent in 2008, becoming one of the countries with the best economic
performances in Latin America. The GDP per capita increased from USD 4,459 in 1990 to USD
9,421 in 2012 (BCRP, 2012). Several mining projects have contributed to this growth, including
the newly-proposed Tı´a Marı´a mining project.
The graph in Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the percentage of GDP coming from
both agriculture and extractive activities, including oil and mining extraction. Data are from INEI
and present values for all years between 1950 and 2015. The graph shows that the share of the
economy coming from agriculture was higher than extractive activities, including oil and mining
extraction, only until 1954. According to the data for 2015, manufacturing was still the most
important economic activity in Peru and accounted for 13.7 percent of the GDP. Manufacturing
was followed by oil and mining extraction (12.1 percent), commerce (10.9 percent), construction
(6.2 percent) and then agriculture (5.2 percent).
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Figure 4.1: GDP according to Economic Activity, Peru 1950-2015
Source: Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica, Downloaded on January
20, 2017. Data shows the percentage of GDP that corresponds to both Agriculture and Extractive
Activities between 1950 and 2015.
4.1.1 New Extractivism
Several studies have shown that the expansion of the mining industry has contributed to the onset
of contentious politics across Latin America. This expansion has been described by scholars as
“new mining,” and includes changes in the pace and scale of the project development, as well
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as an increase in the interaction between extraction and investment (Bebbington, 2009). “New
extractivism” has increased the need for water, land, and energy, while decreasing the need for
unskilled labor as technological conditions have improved (Arce, 2014). Rural populations are
then affected by the mining extraction in a country of 31.2 million people, which has rich deposits
of copper, gold, silver, lead, zinc, natural gas and petroleum (EY, 2016). In fact, Peru has a
long history of being a mining country. Resource extraction in the country dates back to the
operations of the American mining company Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation (CPCC) in the
1900s (Kruijt and Vellinga, 1979). Nowadays, the extraction of natural resources has contributed to
recent economic growth. China is the biggest investor in Mining Projects in Peru with a registered
investment of USD 13,389.00 (23.23 percent of the total mining production). Other main investors
are the United States (16.7 percent), Canada (15.02 percent), Switzerland (8.73 percent), and the
United Kingdom (8.39 percent), among others (MINEM, 2014). Foreign companies investing in
Peru are a direct consequence of the neoliberal policies implemented by President Fujimori.
Under the “New extractivism” approach, technological improvements reduced the need for un-
skilled labor, thus decreasing labor disputes between mining companies and workers (Bebbington
and Bury, 2009). New disputes are increasingly related to the protection of the environment. Mega
extractive mining projects, megaproyectos, have an increasing demand for land, water, and energy.
Technological conditions, such as open-pit mining and heap-leach extraction, require greater ac-
cess to these natural resources. Bebbington (2009) explains that the new actors involved in protests
against mineral resources extraction are the rural and urban populations affected by mining activ-
ities. Arce (2014) also explores the new actors in social conflicts, and the types of coalitions that
aggrieved anti-mining groups. These coalitions traversed social classes, the urban and rural divide,
and environmental and nationalistic discourses (2014).
Arce (2016) presents two types of claims regarding the diversity of mobilizations concerning
mining activities: rights- and service-based claims. On one hand, rights-based mobilization at-
tempts to defend basic rights, such as access to water, respect for the environment, and respect for
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indigenous rights to land. People participating in these mobilizations frame their claims within the
discourse of environmental protection (Arce, 2016). On the other hand, service-based mobiliza-
tions refers to an equitable distribution of the revenues and wealth produced by mineral extractive
activities. Unlike rights-based protesters, service-based protesters do not seek to stop the activi-
ties of the mining companies (Arce, 2016). The literature on the topic of protest in Peru rarely
considers the impact of agriculture as a factor explaining the onset of protest, so that is where my
research project comes in.
The extraction of natural resources has accounted for conflict with local communities over the
use of land and water (Bebbington, Bebbington and Bury, 2010; Bury, 2005; De Echave et al.,
2009; Himley, 2010; Gil, 2009; Salas Carreno, 2008; Li, 2015). Based on the Observatory of Con-
flict Minerals in Latin America (OCMAL), Peru has the greatest number and severity of conflicts.
1 For instance, the 2014 annual report from the Peruvian Office of the Ombudsman records 276
conflicts, of which 60.9 percent (or 168) are categorized as socio-environmental (Defensoria del
Pueblo, 2016). This category of conflict deals with mobilizations because of resource extractive
activities. In addition, over the period 2006-2011, almost 200 people have died in the country
because of social protests. The deceased are categorized by the government as “victims of so-
cial violence,” as distinct from victims whose deaths result from subversive violence or common
delinquency.
4.1.2 Consulta Previa
Increasing social conflicts led both local and international actors to adopt measures to promote
mediation and dialogue. On the one hand, different international organizations, including UNDP,
USAID, and the European Union (EU), have invested in programs to implement mediation in those
conflicts. On the other hand, the Peruvian government passed laws that aim to protect the inter-
1Data come from the Mapa de conflictos mineros, proyectos y empresas mineras en America Latina, produced by
the Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina, OCMAL 2015
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ests and demands of the local communities, including the Consulta Previa, or law of consultation.
In addition, the social society has launched different organizations, including the National Con-
federation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), and the Training and
Intervention Group of Sustainable Development (GRUFIDES).
Mechanisms designed to mitigate social conflict are becoming widespread in Peru. For in-
stance, the mobilizations that took place in Tambogrande, a mining project located in the province
of Piura, influenced the adoption of a popular referendum to oppose the development of mining ac-
tivities. In addition, the conflict in Bagua, or Baguazo, pressured the Peruvian government to adopt
the the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention or Convention 169 (C169) of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), which Peru ratified in 1994, but never enforced. Peru also enforced the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Sanborn and Paredes,
2014). C169 promotes participation rights through consultation to indigenous communities about
issues that affect them. C169 states in Article 15:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or subsurface resources or
rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programs for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertain-
ing to their lands. 2
Peru adopted the Law of the Right to Previous Consultation for Indigenous and Native Peoples,
or Consulta Previa on September 6, 2011. Following the tragic events in the Baguazo, and a
recommendation by the Constitutional Tribunal, the newly inaugurated President Ollanta Humala
promulgated the law, incorporating C169 into national legislation (Sanborn and Paredes, 2014).
This new law requires companies to seek prior consultation on development projects in indigenous
lands, aiming to include indigenous peoples and local communities regarding any legislation or
administrative measures that affect them (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer, 2015).
2C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)
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Consulta Previa is an important law in Peru, a country with a large indigenous population,
and where most of the hydrocarbon and mineral concessions are located in territories owned or
occupied by Indigenous people (Sanborn and Paredes, 2014). Sanborn and Paredes (2014) explain
that this law requires all concessions to private operators to consult any indigenous group affected
by a concession. This legislature has been controversial since its enactment due to several factors,
including the definition of who is “indigenous”, and issues with retroactivity, since ILO C169 was
ratified by Peru in 1994. Despite its limitations, Consulta Previa is an important effort made by the
government to respect the will of indigenous peoples, thus creating a framework to resist the polit-
ical and economic elites in Lima. More work is necessary regarding this effort to institutionalize
inter-cultural dialogue.
However, the opportunity to be consulted regarding the development of natural resource extrac-
tion projects was not a right for all local communities. The administrations of Alejandro Toledo
(2001-2006), Alan Garcı´a (2006-2011), Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), and that of Pedro Pablo
Kuczynski (2016-present) favored an open market-economy, thus continuing the expansion of the
private sector and welcoming foreign investment. The Tı´a Marı´a mining project is one example of
the openness of the Peruvian government to foreign investment in the extractive economy. A case
of a mining project that has been controversial since its announcement, and presents components
that have sparked the onset of protest in a mining setting.
4.2 Field Study
Tı´a Marı´a is a mining project located in the Province of Islay, in the Southern Peruvian Region of
Arequipa. The project is close to the Tambo Valley, a highly productive agricultural area in the
South of Peru. Historically, the valley has been considered “Arequipa’s Pantry,” with important
agricultural production, including rice, garlic, onion, potatoes, and sugarcane. The closest point to
the Tambo Valley is the district of Cocachacra, also in the Province of Islay, 2.5 kilometers away
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from the mining location (SPCC, 2015).
The polymetallic mining project, which belongs to Grupo Me´xico, has copper as its dominant
metal. The mining project is expected to produce 120,000 tons of copper per year (SPCC, 2015).
Southern Peru is expected to make an investment of USD 1,400.00 billion for the project, which
will include the construction of two open-pits, Tı´a Marı´a and La Tapada (SPCC, 2015). First,
it would operate the open-pit of La Tapada, which is located in Quebrada Cachullo. Second, it
would operate the open-pit of Tı´a Marı´a, which is located in Pampa Yamayo. The mining project
is expected to run for twenty years (SPCC, 2015).
An important feature of this mining project will be the installation of seawater desalination
plants (SPCC, 2015). The desalination process will use water from the Pacific Ocean, due to the
limited availability of fresh water in the region (SPCC, 2015). The Tambo River is the main source
of fresh water, which is the basis for agriculture.
Grupo Mexico’s Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) announced its activities of a de-
tailed exploration of the reservoir of the Tı´a Marı´a Project in May 2003 (SPCC, 2015). In May
2008, Water Management Consultants started the preparation of the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (EIA) of the copper project. The EIA was revised by the United Nations Office for Project
Services (UNOPS) in March 2011. The U.N. agency made 138 observations to the Tı´a Marı´a
project’s EIA, including delimitation (Arce, 2016). Social unrest initiated in April 2011 in the
Tambo Valley, where demonstrators protested against the project and confronted the police (Arce,
2016). Andre´s Taype Choquepuma, a 22-year-old, became the first victim of the violent protests
on April 4th. Three other people died on April 7 (Hill, 2015).
In November 2013, Southern Copper presented the second EIA to the Peruvian Ministry of
Energy and Mines (MEM). One year later, in August 2014, the Ministry approved the EIA of the
project. Peruvian Minister of Environment Manuel Pulgar-Vidal declared that the mine’s newest
EIA proves “there is no chance that mining waste can ever reach nearby water supplies, particularly
the Tambo River” (Hill, 2015). The Peruvian government of Ollanta Humala considered that all
52
the 138 UNOPS observations have been resolved by the newest EIA. The Peruvian government did
not send the second EIA to UNOPS or any other independent agency for review, claiming that the
EIA “has already been approved” (Hill, 2015). Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) then
announced an investment of US 1,400.00 million (SPCC, 2015). NGO Labor released a report on
a survey showing that 87 percent of the residents of the Province of Islay believe that a new and
independent environmental impact study should be conducted for Tı´a Marı´a (Arce, 2016).
The Tı´a Marı´a mining project reveals opposition for resource extraction (Arce, 2016). The pub-
lic opinion regarding mining projects is divided amongst Peruvians. There is widespread knowl-
edge that mining produces great profits to the country’s economy. However, most Peruvians do
not see themselves benefited from those gains. In May 2015, Ipsos Opinion released the results
of a national survey regarding the conflict in Tı´a Marı´a. The survey released that in order to gen-
erate confidence within the population, the mining company should generate jobs within the local
population, present an EIA that is approved by the central government, and should respect the
commitments they had with the local population (IPSOS, 2015). Arce (2016) argues that individ-
uals who perceive. In addition, the IPSOS survey presented results regarding public awareness
about the mining project, which I include in Figure 4.2. It is clear to see that as protests unfolded,
people became familiar with what was going on in Arequipa. Results suggested that in April 2015,
only 29 percent of the population was informed about the Tı´a Marı´a mining project, but the rate
increased to 51 percent in May 2015. In a second graph, Figure 4.3 shows the approval rates of the
Tı´a Marı´a mining projects among the population. The pattern is clear to show that as the protests
unfolded the approval rates fell from 60 percent in April 2015 to 46 percent in May 2015 (IPSOS,
2015).
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Figure 4.2: Public Awareness of Tia Maria Mining Project (2015)
Source: Data from Ipsos Opinion, downloaded on June 16, 2016
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Figure 4.3: Approval of Tia Maria Mining Project (2015)
Source: Data from Ipsos Opinion, downloaded on June 16, 2016
4.3 Interviews
I conducted a total of 30 interviews with villagers and local community leaders regarding the situ-
ation of social conflict in the Tı´a Marı´a mining project. The information gathered is a component
to answer my research question in the case study of Tı´a Marı´a. In Tı´a Marı´a I first observed the
conflict between agriculture and mining as economic activities, and the use of land and water. An
interesting aspect that was clear across the Tambo Valley was the extensive use of a light-green
flag with the motto “Agro Sı´, Mina No” (Agriculture yes, Mining not).
I interviewed people in the districts of Dea´n Valdivia, Cocachacra, La Curva, and El Fiscal. On
May 27, 2016, I arrived to the province of Islay in the region of Arequipa and conducted interviews
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independently. As per the request of the Social Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB), all
names of respondents used in this research project are pseudonyms to manage anonymity and
confidentiality.
In the district of Cocachacra, 6.2 km away from the proposed mine, many of the houses had
the light-green flag flying in their roofs. “Sandra,” a local young woman that worked at a local
store, told me that “Agriculture is the most important economic activity in Peru, and that the Cen-
tral Government, instead of supporting the development of agriculture, defends and supports the
mining activities that pollute our water and destroy our crops.” 3 The picture in Figure 4.4 shows
the flag in the Province of Islay, which was used also in churches and schools.
Comments from the local population suggested that the mining project might cause pollution
that will threat agricultural activities. The two Environmental Impact Assessment (EIAs) presented
by Southern Peru are not enough to convince the local population. “Rocio,” a street vendor in La
Curva district, is worried about the health of her children. “A mine pollutes. It will pollute the air,
the soil, and the water. Our kids will suffer from minerals. In other mines, they found mercury
and I don’t know what else in the kids’ bodies. They [the Mining company] better stay out of the
Tambo Valley.” 4
3“Sandra,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
4“Rocio,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
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Figure 4.4: House with “Agro Si, Mina No” flag in Cocachacra, Islay
Source: Author’s collection, May 27, 2016
Distrust in the Central Government seemed to be widespread across the Tambo Valley. “Jorge,”
a farmer in El Fiscal district, said that the government “lies and presents information that is dif-
ferent from reality.” 5 He is convinced that the government represents only the interests of great
multinational corporations, in this case Southern Copper, and that the interests of local communi-
ties are ignored. “They [the Central Government and/or Politicians] only care about what we think
during elections times, other than that they forget about us.” 6
The protests that took place in April-May 2015 revealed the severity of the social conflict.
“Ricardo,” a truck driver in the district of Dea´n Valdivia, declared about the intensity of the protests.
5“Jorge,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
6“Jorge,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
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“The police is aggressive and they have killed many farmers.” 7 He explains that the police carried
real bullets, as opposed to the established rubber bullets, which are the widely used to disperse
protests and control riots.
“Sandra” points out that “the media portrays in the news that the local farmers are aggressive,
but we are only defending ourselves.” 8 This perceived bias is creating more distrust and anger
from the local population. Some of the respondents were neutral about the mining project, but
demanded transparency. “Miguel,” a school teacher in Cocachacra district, mentioned that “the
mining project will bring progress to the Valley. I’m not opposed to the project, but I’m opposed
to how’s being handled. The government cannot send the army and the mining company cannot lie
about the environmental study. They need to build good relationships with the people here.”9 Most
of my respondents when asked about a possible solution to the social conflict agreed that dialogue
is important. “But dialogue in which the Central government, the mining company, and the local
population are talking at the same level,” “Miguel” declared. 10
4.4 Findings
My field study in the Tambo Valley demonstrated the importance of leadership in social move-
ments. The Tambo Valley Defense Front (FADVT) president, Jose Pepe Julio Gutie´rrez, was
arrested amidst a corruption scandal of bribery (Post, 2016). Gutie´rrez allegedly asked for a US
1.5 million bribe from Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) to end protests, otherwise he
claimed “I will burn Troy” (Post, 2016). The alleged conversation occurred between Gutierrez
and an environmentalist lawyer, who claimed was negotiating on behalf of SPCC. Gutie´rrez was
arrested and subsequently expelled from his leftist political party Land and Freedom (Movimiento
Tierra y Libertad (MTL)). Gutie´rrez incriminated two other anti-mining leaders, Dea´n Valdivia
7“Ricardo,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
8“Sandra,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
9“Miguel,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
10“Miguel,” interviewed by Jhader Aguad, May 26, 2016
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district mayor Jaime De La Cruz and Tambo Valley Farmers Board president Jesu´s Cornejo (Post,
2016). The opinions in the Valley are divided. “Sandra” believes that the audios were fabricated
by the authorities to incriminate their leader, whom she believes represent the real interests of the
local population. However, “Miguel” claims that the anti-mining leadership is as corrupted as the
Central Government, and that for real dialogue to happen, new elected faces should represent the
interests of the farmers.
The great majority of the population at the Tambo Valley works in agriculture and they see
the arrival of the mining company as a threat to their valley and their main economic activity.
The majority of the population opposes the development of a mining project. In October 2014,
mayors opposed to the project were elected in the province of Islay, as well as in the districts of
Cocachacra, Dea´n Valdivia and Punta de Bombon.
Villagers declared that there were directly affected by the violent protests. The government’s
decision to send the military was not well-received by the population, because they felt they were
being treated as delinquents. De Echave considers that militarizing a conflict is a clear sign that
the government is not prepared to deal with social protests (Hill, 2015). The use of force to control
protests corresponds to an ongoing narrative used to delegitimize those claims by local actors, by
calling them “terrorists” (Hill, 2015). People at the Tambo Valley mistrust the national government,
which approved the EIA and issued the permits, and social factors were neglected.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the case study of the Tı´a Marı´a mining project. Following a field study
across mining towns in the Tambo Valley, I conducted interviews with community members about
their opinions regarding mining activities and protest. I analyzed the relationship between mining
and agricultural economic activities. In this case study I found the great impact of leadership as a
factor explaining the onset of protest.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Significance of the thesis
This thesis makes several contributions. First, it adds to the emerging literature on the existence of
a local resource curse that sparks protest mostly in areas where natural resource extraction occurs
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2008). Even though, the empirical results showed that the estimation results
for the interaction term between agricultural importance a mining announcement were negative
and statistically significant, not being consistent with the framework provided, further research is
necessary to explain why when a mining project is announced in a mostly agricultural province the
likelihood of protest decreases. Future research on the topic should focus on the conditions that
allow mobilization in Peru, as well as more case studies from the particular mining projects where
protests did not occur. Even though I developed a panel dataset with both positive and negative
cases, the scope of my research did not allow me to further explore why protests did not occur?
I only considered protest activity in the wake of mining projects as my dependent variable (DV),
further studies should focus on the variation of protest in all categories, as well as focusing on
other particular categories such as conflicts over land, conflicts over labor regulations, and other
forms of natural resource extraction, such as oil and hydrocarbons.
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Second, this thesis uses a mixed-methods analysis of the spatial and cross-temporal variation in
protest at the sub-national level in Peru. Combining quantitative methods through two regression
analyses, and qualitative methods through interviews in my field study in the Tambo Valley in the
province of Islay, allowed me to present a more comprehensive picture of the variation of protest
in Peru. I used a mixed-methods analysis approach because one method might be insufficient to
describe thoroughly the relationship between mining, agriculture and protest activity. Drawing on
the limitations of both methods and enhancing their strengths, I was able to utilize the case study
in order to explain causal mechanism that the empirical analysis might have missed.
Third, I included in this thesis perspectives and personal stories that are often disregarded in
studies about mining activities. Sumac Kawsay and the rights of nature, as well as Exclusion The-
ories are often not implemented as background in studies that explore the conflictivity of mining
activities. I recognize the inherent value that an analysis of these concepts and theories bring to
the understanding of the national context. Furthermore, my personal experience with protest in
Arequipa allowed me to provide a first-hand account of some of the events.
Fourth, the conditions of poverty and inequality in Peru could only be understood after a com-
plex and historical analysis of local factors across time. The informal economy, the lack of property
rights, the exclusion of the peasant economy, internal armed conflict, and the economic crisis were
factors that explained the impoverished and marginalized situation of some local communities in
Peru, particularly in rural areas. The capitalist approach and the neoliberal reforms implemented
by Alberto Fujimori seemingly reinforced the exclusion of the peasantry and marginalized com-
munities in the Andes and the Amazon jungle. This exclusion might have increased grievances and
might have further incremented the number of protest events across provinces in Peru.
Sustainable Mining
Can mining in Peru be sustainable? Kirsch argues that the concept of “sustainable mining” is
an oxymoron itself and that there is indisputable evidence of the environmental damage caused by
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mining activities (Kirsch, 2010). However, mining companies in Peru have been increasingly using
the concept of sustainability, often understood by the corporation as economic development that
will outlast the life of a mining project. Mining companies often avoid a definition of sustainability
that focuses on the relationship between economy and ecology. This modification of the discourse
on sustainability covers fact that there have been no significant reforms in how mining is practiced
in countries like Peru. This concept of sustainability opposes the relationship between the environ-
ment and Sumac Kawsay, which promotes an environmental sustainability that is envisioned as a
broad suite of healthy and durable social and ecological trends (Zimmerer, 2012).
Dialogue and Representation
Is the coexistence between mining and agriculture possible in Peru? Are efforts by mining com-
panies to redress social conflicts enough? If not, what does it take for the local communities to
accept the development of a mining project across provinces? My findings suggest that there is a
need for better mechanisms of representation in social movements. Democratically elected leader-
ship must respond to the needs and expectations of the local populations, and also represent those
claims at the regional and national level. A higher demand for representation occurs in an epoch of
descentralization in the Peruvian government. The government has attempted to establish roundta-
bles for dialogue, but those roundtables do not have accurate representation of the stakeholders,
particularly indigenous groups.
The rights of nature will remain as a contested topic in political spheres of Peru. The coun-
try’s political and economic elites could draw from examples abroad in order to include a more
comprehensive and inclusive legislature, which takes in consideration indigenous ontological and
epistemological philosophies. First, the case of Ecuador represents a small victory for the indige-
nous populations of that country. In 2008, the government of President Rafael Correo adopted the
Constitution of Montecristi, which is the first in the world to recognize legally enforceable Rights
of Nature (Acosta, 2010). In the document, Articles 71-74 prohibit the extraction of non-renewable
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resources in protected areas. Peruvian indigenous share a similar culture with the indigenous pop-
ulations in Ecuador, but have not yet received the same level of recognition in politics or the
economy. Furthermore, the case of the Maori indigenous tribe in New Zealand represents another
example of the transitioning adopting of indigeneity at the national level in politics. The Maori
tribe recently gained recognition for the Whanganui River, which now is recognized as a living
entity with the same legal rights as a human being. Peru could further integrate its indigenous
communities and the examples of Ecuador and New Zealand proved that it is possible.
The case of Ma´xima Acun˜a is helpful in understanding the conflict between mining and agri-
culture in the Peruvian local context. Acun˜a is an indigenous farmer who represents the struggle
of rural communities in resisting the expansion of mining activities. She is in a legal battle against
Yanacocha Mining Company, which owns the Conga Project in the provinces of Cajamarca and
Celendı´n in northern Peru. The Conga Project would be the biggest gold mine in South America,
but has been postponed by the Peruvian government after the death of five demonstrators during
violent protests in 2012. Acun˜a is resisting the expansion of the activities of the mine, which is
trying to buy her 60-acre plot of land to construct an open-pit gold mine. Acun˜a recently received
the Goldman prize, the world’s most prestigious environmental award, for her struggle against ex-
tractive activities (Collyns, 2016). Acun˜a’s award brought international attention to the struggle
of thousands of farmers in Peru and further evidence the possible clashes between mining and
agriculture.
The Future of Protest
This thesis is written as Peru slows its economic growth, influenced by the decline in commod-
ity prices worldwide, the economic slowdown of China, and higher interest rates in the United
States. Now, the mining boom is over and Peru’s new government needs to focus on sustaining
growth and social progress in a less favorable climate. The administration of Pedro Pablo Kuczyn-
ski (2016-present) should attempt to diversify the economy and increase expenditures on health
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and education. In a country where almost seven million people live in poverty, a revision of the
economic system is necessary. The local factors that perpetuate poverty and the exclusion of in-
digenous peoples and rural communities need to be addressed. Until then, the grievances of those
actors will fuel social conflicts and protests across the country.
The former Wall Street investor supports foreign direct investment and has vowed to continue
the neoliberal policies that have ruled Peru since the 1990s. Protest activities have occurred in
the wake of a mining project during the newly-inaugurated Kuczynski administration. The mining
project Las Bambas, located in the provinces of Cotobambas and Grau in the region of Apurimac,
has faced strong opposition from local communities, having protests opposing its development. My
findings suggest that unless more mechanisms of representation and inclusion are not developed
within the framework of the state apparatus, more social conflicts will appear and more protests
will occur.
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